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Abstract 
According to the Nomological Argument, observed regularities in 
nature are best explained by an appeal to a supernatural being. A 
successful explanation must avoid two perils. Some explanations 
provide too little structure, predicting a universe without regularities. 
Others provide too much structure, thereby precluding an explanation 
of certain types of lawlike regularities featured in modern scientific 
theories. We argue that an explanation based in the creative, intentional 
action of a supernatural being avoids these two perils whereas leading 
competitors do not. Although our argument falls short of a full 
defense, it does suggest that the Nomological Argument is worthy of 
philosophical attention.  
 
1 Sketch of the Nomological Argument 
According to the Nomological Argument, a supernatural being provides the best 
explanation of regularities in nature, such as that planets have elliptical orbits, that the 
speed of light is the same in all frames of reference, and that quantum systems evolve 
in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. Although we can’t provide a full defense 
in this paper, we will identify the leading competing hypotheses and argue that Divine 
Voluntarism—the hypothesis that regularities are explained by a supernatural being—
beats them when it comes to two most-crucial explanatory virtues. This at least makes 
a strong prima facie case for preferring Divine Voluntarism to its leading competitors 
and clarifies how the Nomological Argument is to be defended.1  
 
* This is the penultimate draft. The official version: http://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12364  
1 Divine Voluntarism has received some recent attention (Foster 2004, Swinburne 2006, 
Collins 2009a, Orr 2019). However, these discussions have been limited in various respects—
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We’ll begin with a toy example to illustrate the argument’s basic structure and 
to clarify what we mean by ‘explanation’.  
 
Poker: Suppose that you’re playing poker with Al, who deals himself 
a sequence of five consecutive royal flushes (S). Naturally, you consider 
the following two hypotheses: 
 
Fair (F): The cards were dealt from fairly shuffled decks.  
 
Cheating (C): Al manipulated the decks. 
 
Presumably you’re justified in preferring C to F. C has the best balance of two 
dialectical virtues. First, it’s at least somewhat plausible independently of the observed 
sequence S.  Second, C makes S plausible, whereas F doesn’t at all. 
 We can use the odds form of Bayes’ theorem to make this reasoning more 
precise.  
 
Bayes’ Theorem: !(#!|%)	
!(#"|%)	
= !(%|#!)!(#!)
!(%|#")!(#")
	       
 
On the left, we have the posterior ratio, !(#!|%)
!(#"|%)
. Its terms are conditional probabilities. 
They describe how probable each hypothesis H is given an observation O. The first 
ratio on the right is the likelihood ratio, !(%|#!)
!(%|#")
. Its terms are conditional probabilities as 
well, but they describe how probable the observation O is given each hypothesis H. 
The second ratio on the right is the prior ratio,  !(#!)
!(#")
. Its terms describe how probable 
each hypothesis is prior to the observation. Hence, they’re called prior probabilities. Our 
 
for example, none carefully considers the now-popular Primitivism about laws (see Section 2). 
As a result, it is difficult to extract a plausible Nomological Argument from extant discussion. 
The Nomological Argument bears some similarities to the older Eutaxiological Argument (cf. 
Barrow and Tipler 1986: 29), which we’ll discuss later in this section. 
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argument is probabilistic, rather than an explicit inference to the best explanation.2 
However, we’ll assume that the hypothesis that best explains an observation is the one 
with the highest posterior probability. Thus, Bayes’ theorem implies that the best 
hypothesis has the best balance of likelihood and prior probability. (Note that the 
posterior ratio is greater than 1 whenever the likelihood ratio is greater than the inverse 
prior ratio, !(#")
!(#!)
.) 
 Let’s apply this to Poker. We’ll suppose that P(F) is greater than P(C), because 
fair play is more common than competent cheating. As far as priors are concerned, 
the scales tip toward F. However, it seems that P(S|C) is much greater than P(S|F), 
because P(S|F) is extremely low.3 As far as likelihood is concerned, the scales tip 
toward C. Intuitively, the difference in likelihood swamps the difference in priors—
more precisely, the likelihood ratio !((|))
!((|*)
 is greater than the inverse prior ratio !(*)
!())
—
so C is the better explanation. For reasons we’ll discuss later (in § 5), there are 
important background assumptions relevant to the assignments of priors. But we can 
ignore this complication for now. 
 At this point, you may be wondering how these probabilities are to be 
interpreted.4 They don’t merely report frequencies, either actual or hypothetical. And 
they don’t describe objective chances, because either Al cheated or he didn’t. Rather, they 
have an epistemological character. Perhaps they are subjective epistemic probabilities 
(credences) that describe your subjective degrees of belief in the relevant propositions. 
Or perhaps (as we prefer to think of them) they are objective epistemic probabilities that 
describe how strongly you ought to believe the propositions given your total evidence—
i.e., that describe what your credences ought to be. We’ll say more about 
interpretations of probability in Section 5, but we can remain neutral between these 
two epistemological interpretations for now. If you think of the probabilities as 
objective epistemic probabilities, the argument above shows that we ought (in an 
epistemic sense) to believe that Al is cheating in light of our total evidence. In contrast, 
 
2 Of course, one might argue that inference to the best explanation, if coherent, is ultimately 
just Bayesian inference (Climenhaga 2017). 
3 The probability of getting a royal flush on any given fairly dealt hand in a game of Texas 
Hold ’Em, a popular version of poker, is approximately 1 in 31,000.  
4 For introductions to interpretations of probability, see Mellor (2005) and Hájek (2019).  
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if you think of them as subjective epistemic probabilities, and you don’t think there 
are any constraints on the assignment of priors, the argument above merely shows that 
it is rational for those who agree with our assignments of probabilities to be confident that Al is 
cheating.5 Similar remarks apply to the interpretation of probabilities involved in the 
Nomological Argument. 
The Nomological Argument is based on the idea that someone imposes order 
on nature in much the same way that a cheater imposes order on a deck of cards. In 
the rest of this section we’ll sketch the argument, motivate it on an intuitive level, and 
identify some central challenges.  
To begin, we’ll say something about the notion of order involved in our 
version of the argument. Up to this point we have used terms such as ‘regularity’ and 
‘order’ in their loose and popular senses; from now on we’ll be precise. The general 
notion of a regularity or pattern is familiar, but our version of the Nomological 
Argument is based on a slightly more specific and more sophisticated notion of a 
pattern—roughly, the sort of pattern that is described by statements of laws in modern 
scientific theories, all of which have a mathematical character. Consider Newton’s Law 
of Universal Gravitation: 𝐹+ = 	𝐺
,!,"
-"
. The terms in scientific equations such as this 
describe precise quantities of physical properties—in this case, determinate quantities 
of determinable properties of Force, Mass, etc. Any other example of a dynamical law 
would work just as well as an illustration, because the precise content of laws and the 
regularities they describe is not what matters. The Nomological Argument is not based 
on the fact that our universe contains the exact regularities that it does in fact contain.6 
Rather, it is based on the more general claim that the observed parts of nature contain 
regularities involving a certain level of sophistication, such that they can be adequately 
described only with the language of mathematics. (Categorical logic, for example, is 
not up to the task.) Henceforth, whenever we use the term regularity (R) and its cognates 
we have in mind the sorts of regularities distinctive of laws of modern scientific 
 
5 If the italicized clause makes the argument sound underwhelming, it’s worth pointing out 
that subjectivists think such a clause applies to all probabilistic arguments.  
6 That would lead us in the direction of a fine-tuning argument, making it vulnerable to the 
objection that it’s extremely improbable that God would select exactly this set of regularities 
as opposed to another; cf. White (2000: 272) and Metcalf (2018: 17-18). 
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theories. When we need to talk about patterns in a more general sense, we’ll use the 
terms patterns or order. Thus, all regularities are patterns, but not all patterns are 
regularities; all worlds with regularities are orderly, but not all orderly worlds contain 
regularities. When we need to discuss a pattern that is not a regularity, we’ll call it a 
mere pattern. Likewise, an orderly world with no regularities has mere order.  
The Nomological Argument is distinguished from other a posteriori 
arguments for the existence of God primarily by its use of evidentiary statement R as 
opposed to some other evidentiary statement. Cosmological arguments are based on 
even more general or abstract features of the world, such as the mere presence of 
contingency. Fine-tuning arguments (and other design arguments) are based on highly 
specific features of the universe, such as the fact that nature contains laws whose 
content involves constants that fall within an extremely narrow range of values capable 
of supporting life. Thus, the Nomological Argument is in an intermediate position 
between cosmological arguments and standard design arguments. This confers some 
advantages. For example, like contingency, regularity is a fairly abstract, general feature 
of the world. But it’s more obvious than contingency, since it does not require us to 
detect the modal qualities of the world. It merely requires us to be in the position to 
notice that nature’s patterns can be described in precise, quantitative terms. Moreover, 
the mere fact that nature contains regularities is much more obvious than the fact that 
it contains the specific design-like regularities featured in standard design arguments. 
Arguably, modern science would not be possible if there were no regularities, so we 
can think of the Nomological Argument as an argument for the existence of a 
supernatural being based on the mere possibility of doing modern science. As a result, 
the Nomological Argument is much less sensitive than standard design arguments to 
changes in our best science. As for other design arguments, the Nomological 
Argument is a close relative of, or perhaps a version of, the Eutaxiological Argument, 
which is based on the general orderliness and comprehensibility of the universe (cf. 
Barrow and Tipler 1986: 29ff and Manson 2003: 2).7 However, as noted above, the 
claim that our world contains regularities is more specific than the claim that it is 
orderly, and the Nomological Argument isn’t concerned with comprehensibility per 
 
7 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we draw attention to this connection. 
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se. Since the Nomological Argument is based on the explanation of lawlike regularities 
distinctive of modern science, rather than an explanation of mere order and 
comprehensibility, we think it is appropriate to introduce a new title: hence the label 
‘Nomological.’   
As noted above, the Nomological Argument shares the same basic form as our 
reasoning about the Poker case. The question, then, is what sorts of hypotheses might 
be introduced to explain regularities. Here are two (don’t worry; we’ll consider more 
later): 
 
Humeanism (H): The distribution of properties in our world is simply a 
brute fact: a basic feature of our metaphysics for which there is no 
metaphysical explanation.8 
 
Divine Voluntarism (G): There is an intelligent being that has the power 
to intentionally control the distribution of properties in our world—
that is, whether there are regularities or mere patterns or no patterns 
at all.9 
 
We’ll call the intelligent being featured in Divine Voluntarism God. However, Divine 
Voluntarism does not claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. 
It doesn’t even claim that God is a person who cares about us.10 In any case, just as we 
argued that Cheating is better than Fair in light of observed sequence S, you can argue 
that Divine Voluntarism is better than Humeanism in light of observed regularities R. For 
 
8 Humeanism is so-called because it does not countenance any necessary connections. 
Proponents include those who reduce laws to regularities in a Humean base (Lewis 1973, 
Loewer 1996, Beebee 2000, Schaffer 2008), and also those who deny necessary connections 
while rejecting reductive Humean analyses of laws (van Fraassen 1989).  
9 Recent proponents include Foster (2004), Swinburne (2006), and Collins (2009a). Divine 
Voluntarism was popular during the Early Modern period, with Descartes, Malebranche, 
Berkeley, and perhaps Newton as proponents (Ott 2009, especially 1.1 and Chapter 7).  
10 Divine Voluntarism doesn’t say how God brings about regularities. For example, it can be 
paired with occasionalism (Plantinga 2016), dispositionalism (Adams 2018), and natural kind 
essentialism (Dumsday 2012, 146). This is an issue internal to the theory, and we won’t discuss 
it further. 
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example, you might concede that P(G) < P(H), but argue that P(R|G) >> P(R|H). By 
Bayes’ Theorem, these premises imply that P(G|R) > P(H|R).11 
Let’s now consider the specific probabilities involved in the Nomological 
Argument, beginning with the priors. Prior to observing regularities, Humeanism may 
seem more plausible than Divine Voluntarism. After all, positing a god may seem 
ontologically profligate, and Divine Voluntarism may seem to be a more-specific 
metaphysical hypothesis than Humeanism, and therefore a hypothesis that’s somewhat 
less modest. Thus, let’s suppose that P(H) > P(G). But is it really that much greater? G 
and H are both metaphysical hypotheses; both are fairly general (remember, we’ve said 
very little about God!); arguably considerations of parsimony don’t count for all that 
much; there are very smart experts on both sides; and metaphysics is really hard. For 
these reasons, it would be surprising if we could justify vastly different priors for P(H) 
and P(G)—say, a difference of more than a few orders of magnitude.  
Let’s turn to P(R|H). Humeanism stipulates that the actuality of our world, as 
opposed to any other Humean world, is simply a brute fact. In denying that there are 
necessary connections between distinct existences, Humeanism commits itself to a 
recombination principle concerning particular matters of fact: any distribution of 
properties is possible. The result is an extremely large class of epistemically possible 
Humean worlds, the vast majority of which do not contain widespread and systematic 
regularities. Nothing in the Humean ontology suggests that we should assign a higher 
prior probability to some worlds (namely, the ones with regular property distributions) 
than others (namely, the irregular ones). Thus, P(R|H) is extremely low, because 
regularities occur in only a miniscule proportion of Humean possible worlds.12 
 
11 Of course, the Total Evidence Requirement demands that we take into account all the 
relevant evidence, and perhaps there is some evidence that could also pro tanto lower P(G) or 
raise P(H). We can’t consider all such arguments, but we’ll discuss a couple of possibilities 
below, in §§ 4 and 5. 
12 For defenses of this controversial claim, see Armstrong (1983), Fales (1990, especially 
Chapter 4), Bird (2007, 86-90), Tooley (2011), Hildebrand (2013), Filomeno (2019), and Segal 
(forthcoming). Though it’s controversial, we won’t say more in defense of it, except to briefly 
discuss one potential objection relevant to statement R. You might worry that we’ve ignored 
an observation selection effect. Suppose for the moment that we live in an infinitely large 
Humean universe. Then we should not expect to observe irregularity, since if we were in an 
irregular part of the universe life wouldn’t be possible. Nevertheless, certain features of our 
actual observation of regularity remain remarkable. If Humeanism were true, and if we were 
fully aware of the phenomena of observation selection effects, we would expect to live in a 
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 In contrast, we can think of reasons why a powerful, intelligent being would 
prefer to create regular worlds. Certain moral or aesthetic properties can be realized 
only in regular worlds, and an agent might have some preference for worlds that realize 
such properties. To elaborate very slightly, certain properties might require 
regularities—namely, patterns of the sort involved in modern scientific theories—over 
and above the relatively simpler sorts of patterns that can be stated using categorical 
logic alone. This is not to say that P(R|G) is high; it’s just to say that it’s not terribly 
low. But given that P(R|H) is extremely low, P(R|G) >> P(R|H).  
Summing up, the Nomological Argument seems to be analogous to our 
reasoning about the Poker case in at least the following respects.13 Cheating C is better 
than Fair F, because although it has a lower prior (P(C) < P(F)), it has a vastly higher 
likelihood (P(S|C)>>P(S|F)). Divine Voluntarism G is better than Humeanism H, 
because although it may have a lower prior (P(G)<P(H)), it has a vastly higher 
likelihood (P(R|G)>>P(R|H)). This ends our preliminary sketch of the argument. 
Let’s turn to some initial objections. 
First, it is controversial, especially to empiricists and skeptics about 
metaphysics per se, whether metaphysical explanations of this sort are possible in the 
first place. For example, you might be sympathetic to van Fraassen’s (1989, Chapter 
6) critique of inference to the best explanation. Relatedly, you might harbor doubts 
about our ability to assign probabilities to metaphysical hypotheses.14 For example, we 
rely on a version of the Principle of Indifference at various points in our arguments—
for example, to assign likelihoods such as P(R|H)—but the Principle is susceptible to 
 
universe in which regularity is widespread, but only locally, since it is only local regularity that 
is required to support life. But we don’t observe this; instead, we observe regularity as far as 
observation takes us. To this point, a referee suggested the example of laws of physics’ 
breaking down at high energy levels. We reply that normally, scientists conclude not that nature 
is irregular but that our old theories failed to accurately describe the fundamental regularities.   
13 There are, of course, respects in which the two cases aren’t analogous. For example, our 
shared background knowledge that makes the assignment of probabilities uncontroversial in 
the Poker case. However, we’re not giving an argument from analogy. The Poker case is just 
a heuristic.  
14 Here are two. First is the problem of the priors, which concerns the difficulty of assigning non-
arbitrary prior probabilities to hypotheses of the sort we’re considering. (See Weisberg 2019 
for an accessible introduction.) This is essentially the old empiricist objection that rational 
intuition is mysterious, applied to probabilistic contexts. Second is a concern about assigning 
probabilities to sample spaces that aren’t normalizable (Manson 2009, McGrew et al. 2001, 
Collins 2005, Pruss 2005, McGrew and McGrew 2005).  
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well-known objections.15 Despite this controversy, we’ll simply assume that it’s 
possible to defend explanatory arguments along these sorts of lines. Although the 
controversy is interesting and important, we don’t have the space to engage with these 
objections in this paper. If you’re worried about such objections, you may interpret 
our conclusion as a conditional: if we’re capable of defending the explanatory 
superiority of any non-Humean theory of laws over Humeanism then we should accept 
Divine Voluntarism. That’s an interesting conclusion regardless of your metaphysical 
or theological views. (We know a number of Humeans who would love to be able to 
say that non-Humeans are committed to belief in a supernatural being!) 
 Second, you can always object to an explanatory argument by proposing a 
competing explanation. In our first case, Poker, there is no plausible competing 
explanation of Al’s sequence of hands. This is not so for regularities in nature. The 
literature on the metaphysics of laws is full of competing non-Humean theories that 
purport to explain regularities without appealing to a god.16 We need to consider these 
competing explanations to properly assess the Nomological Argument. We do so in 
Sections 2 and 3. As it turns out, explaining regularities with a non-Humean theory is 
harder than it looks. We’ll argue that the leading non-Humean competitors to Divine 
Voluntarism have various explanatory shortcomings. Understanding the distinctive 
ways in which these theories fall short will help us to identify desiderata for a 
metaphysical explanation of regularities. In Section 4, we’ll argue that Divine 
Voluntarism satisfies these desiderata.” And in Section 5, we’ll argue that Divine 
Voluntarism has a sufficiently high prior probability that it constitutes the all-things-
considered best available explanation of regularities among leading non-Humean 
theories. In other words, we’ll argue that Divine Voluntarism beats its most popular 
competitors with respect to the two key explanatory virtues we’ve identified (though 
we’ll stop short of arguing that it’s more probable than not—i.e., that P(G|R) > 
P(~G|R)). Thus, although we haven’t provided a complete defense of the 
 
15 That said, we do think that our use of indifference-type reasoning is plausible in each specific 
application that features in the Nomological Argument. We are not committed to accepting a 
fully general version of the Principle, so we think we can sidestep some of the traditional 
criticisms (e.g. Fumerton (1995: 214-15)). For a recent defense of applications of the Principle 
to this sort of context, see Filomeno (2019). 
16 See, for example, Armstrong (1983), Fales (1990, especially Chapter 4), Bird (2007: 86-90), 
Tooley (2011), and Hildebrand (2013). 
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Nomological Argument, we hope to have said enough to show that it warrants 
attention. 
2 Primitivism and the Peril of Insufficient Structure 
2.1 Setup 
In this section, we consider the simplest competing explanation to Divine 
Voluntarism: namely, that laws themselves are primitive (Carroll 1994; Maudlin 2007). 
This competing theory has been mostly ignored in extant discussions of Divine 
Voluntarism, but it has some noteworthy advantages. In simplified general form, the 
theory can be stated as follows: 
 
Primitivism (L): Laws are primitive entities in our ontology. The locution 
‘it is a law that’ functions as a modal operator governed by the 
following axiom: necessarily, for all statements p, ˹it is a law that p˺ 
entails p. 
 
Primitivism and Divine Voluntarism are versions of non-Humeanism, since both 
invoke a primitive sort of necessity that imposes structure on the natural world. Both 
theories posit modal primitives with the goal of explaining regularities. Thus, it might 
seem that P(R|L) is just as high as P(R|G), so that the two theories are on a par with 
respect to likelihood. Moreover, since both theories explain by positing unobserved 
non-Humean entities—primitive laws and a divine being, respectively—it may seem 
that the priors should be similar as well. If this is right, Divine Voluntarism is not better 
than Primitivism. If we want to defend the Nomological Argument, we had better find 
something wrong with Primitivism.17 
 
17 There are various well-known objections to Primitivism—for example, that its primitives 
are illicit, that it falls prey to van Fraassen’s (1989) inference problem, etc. However, analogous 
objections can be raised against Divine Voluntarism, and we think successful replies to those 
objections can be adapted by proponents of Primitivism.  
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2.2 Against Primitivism 
The objection we present is due to Hildebrand (2013), and it’s based on the idea that 
Primitivism simply pushes the explanatory problem back a level. We’ll explore this 
objection carefully for two reasons. First, Primitivism hasn’t been carefully considered 
in extant defenses of the Nomological Argument. Second, the objection we raise might 
seem to apply equally well to Divine Voluntarism, so it’s important to get clear on its 
details.  
We’ll introduce the objection by way of a second case.  
 
Simulated Poker: You and Al are playing poker on Al’s 1980s-era 
computer. As before, Al receives five consecutive royal flushes. 
Bothered by Al’s remarkable sequence of hands, you consider the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
Indeterministic Algorithm (IA): Shuffling is simulated by a genuinely 
indeterministic algorithm.  
 
Cheating 2 (C): Al manipulated the algorithm.  
 
You conclude that Al is cheating, but he argues that the following hypothesis is even 
better than Cheating 2:  
 
Deterministic Algorithm (DA): Shuffling is simulated by a deterministic 
algorithm.  
 
According to DA, the sequence of royal flushes was determined in advance by the 
algorithm. The probability of Al’s sequence, given our deterministic algorithm, is 1. 
That’s even higher than the probability of the sequence given the Cheating 2 
hypothesis! Moreover, DA has a higher prior than Cheating 2. (Someone with Al’s 
character is not likely to cheat, and genuinely indeterministic random number 
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generators were rare in 1980s-era computing.) Therefore, you should be willing to play 
at least one more hand—or so Al argues.  
 We don’t expect that you’ll find Al’s argument convincing. It would be 
surprising if Al received this sequence of hands given IA. But it would be just as 
surprising if Al received this sequence of hands given DA. To see why, consider these 
two interpretations:  
 
DA1: Shuffling occurs by some deterministic algorithm. 
 
DA2: Shuffling occurs by a deterministic algorithm that entails S. 
 
The vast majority of deterministic algorithms don’t produce sequence S. For this 
reason, the likelihood P(S|DA1) is extremely low. For exactly the same reason, the 
prior P(DA2) is extremely low. Thus, neither DA1 nor DA2 provides a good 
explanation of sequence S. DA1 has a reasonably high prior, but an unacceptably low 
likelihood; DA2 has a high likelihood, but an unacceptably low prior.18  
 There are some general lessons to be drawn from this case. First, entailment 
does not imply explanation. DA2 entails, but does not explain, S. Second, the 
distinction between indeterminism and determinism is meaningless as far as epistemic 
probabilities are concerned. What matter are the spaces of possibilities. The spaces of 
possibilities for IA and DA are perfectly isomorphic (at least if the algorithms are 
supposed to approximate fair shuffling). Moreover, there’s nothing about one 
hypothesis that makes certain epistemic possibilities more likely than others. It is 
because of this isomorphism that the two theories IA and DA are on an explanatory 
par.  
Having considered this case, Hildebrand’s (2013) objection to Primitivism is 
easy to state. The problem is that Primitivism and Humeanism are perfectly 
isomorphic. Since Humeanism doesn’t offer a satisfying explanation of regularities, 
neither does Primitivism. Here’s a recap of why the Humean explanation of regularities 
 
18 This is a common dilemma for explanatory hypotheses. See, for example, Huemer (2016) 
on external world skepticism and Collins’s (2009b, § 7.2) response to the “more fundamental 
law” objection to FTA.  
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is unsatisfying. Suppose we begin with a metaphysically privileged (i.e., the correct) 
language for describing Humean worlds. It includes terms required to describe 
spacetime—including at least terms for spatiotemporal relations or conventions for 
naming spacetime points—and predicates corresponding to natural properties. That’s 
all. Since Humeanism rejects primitive necessity, it implies a recombination principle 
according to which any logically consistent description of a world in the Humean 
language describes a possible world. Thus, the language generates a space of 
epistemically possible worlds. Nothing in the Humean ontology makes any one world 
intrinsically more likely than another, so we ought to assign them equal probabilities. 
Because the vast majority of worlds don’t exhibit regularities, P(R|H) is very low.  
If we endorse Primitivism, we’ll introduce into our language the modal 
operator ‘it is a law that’, governed by the following axiom: necessarily, for all 
statements p, ˹ it is a law that p˺ entails p. Notice that this axiom provides no guidance—
no restrictions whatsoever—concerning the type of statement to which the operator 
may be attached. Because the operator is primitive, there’s no reason to expect the 
sentences to which it is attached to describe regularities. They could describe particular 
matters of fact, irregularities, gerrymandered facts, or whatever. After all, the operator 
simply attaches to arbitrary sentences in the (otherwise) Humean language. Thus, the 
spaces of epistemic possibilities for Humeanism and Primitivism are isomorphic. 
Moreover, nothing in either ontology provides any epistemic reason to think that some 
of the possibilities in a given space are a priori more likely to obtain than any other 
members of that space. (Suppose you’re given only the following information about a 
possible world: it contains a primitive law. From your epistemic perspective, it is a 
priori much more likely that the “law” in question would make the universe less regular 
rather than more.)19 Thus, we may conclude that P(R|L) is low for the same reasons 
that P(R|H) is low. The move from Humeanism to Primitivism is unhelpful in the 
same way that the move from IA to DA is unhelpful.  
 Perhaps there’s an easy fix: just stipulate that primitive laws are the sorts of 
things that give rise to regularities.   
 
 
19 Compare Tooley (2008) on logical-probability calculations that take into account the 
contributions of unknown factors. 
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Primitivism Restricted (LR): Laws are primitive entities in our ontology. 
The locution ‘it is a law that’ functions as a modal operator governed 
by the following axiom, subject to the restriction below: necessarily, 
for all statements p, ˹it is a law that p˺ entails p. Restriction: The operator 
can only attach to statements that describe regularities.  
 
In fact, both Carroll (1994, 21-27) and Maudlin (2007, 10-15) endorse restrictions of 
this sort. But the problem with LR is that it maintains that restricted primitive laws are 
ontological primitives. For this reason, the move from Primitivism in its general form 
to Primitivism Restricted is analogous to the move from Deterministic Algorithm in 
its general form DA1 to Deterministic Algorithm in its restricted form DA2. The 
restriction is metaphysically arbitrary. As Hildebrand points out (2013: 7ff), there’s no 
difference in ontology between a primitive law in the general sense and a primitive 
restricted law. The two theories accept the same spaces of epistemic possibilities, and 
are distinguished by a mere semantic difference: a primitive necessitating entity that 
gives rise to an irregularity deserves the label ‘law’ on the general theory but not on the 
restricted theory. By way of comparison, consider the following, narrow version of 
Humeanism:  
 
Humean Regularity Theory (HRT): Humeanism is true and there are lawlike natural 
regularities.  
 
Notice that P(R|HRT) is much greater than P(R|H). In fact, P(R|HRT) = 1. But this 
theory acquires the virtue of a high likelihood only by trading away its prior, so that 
P(R|H)P(H) = P(R|HRT)P(HRT). The tradeoff is necessary because the distinction 
between H and HRT is metaphysically arbitrary. One is just a more-restricted version 
of the other. It is the same for Primitivism and Primitivism Restricted: P(R|L)P(L) = 
P(R|LR)P(LR). The more-specific theory acquires a higher likelihood only by reducing 
its prior, so it does not offer a better explanation of regularities. 
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2.3 The Peril of Insufficient Structure 
When Al appeals to Deterministic Algorithm (in any of its forms) to explain S, he 
simply replaces the question ‘Why did S obtain?’ with a question just as difficult: ‘Why 
did we end up with this algorithm?’ Similarly, when we appeal to Primitivism (in any 
of its forms) to explain regularities, we simply replace the question ‘Why did the 
regularities obtain?’ with a question just as difficult: ‘Why did we end up with these 
laws: namely, laws that produce regularities?’ This occurs because the spaces of 
epistemic possibilities for the facts we wish to explain (S, R) are isomorphic to the 
spaces of epistemic possibilities compatible with each theory (DA, L). This is the Peril 
of Insufficient Structure: the theory doesn’t contain enough structure to explain the 
regularities we observe, or even the fact that nature is orderly.  We’ve focused on 
Primitivism’s inability to explain regularities, but our arguments in this section do not 
rely on the patterns being regularities. Humeanism has just as much difficulty 
explaining a toy pattern like “all Fs are Gs” as it does explaining a sophisticated 
regularity, and similarly for Primitivism. In Section 4 we’ll argue that Divine 
Voluntarism avoids this peril. But first we’ll consider more competing theories and 
describe a different explanatory peril. 
3 Other non-Humean theories 
In this section we’ll consider some non-Humean theories that endow laws with 
internal metaphysical structure, and so seem to avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure. 
Indeed, we’ll argue in 3.1 that the probability of order given such theories is high—or 
much higher than on Humeanism. But in 3.2 we’ll argue that these non-Humean 
theories face a different sort of problem: they struggle to explain regularities. In other 
words, although such theories have explanatory power over toy patterns such as “all 
Fs are Gs” they do not have explanatory power over the sophisticated sorts of 
regularities featured in modern science. 
Disclaimer: We can’t consider all competing non-Humean theories, and we can’t 
give any single theory the attention it deserves. We aim for just enough detail to identify 
a different sort of peril. (However, we provide a general taxonomy of non-Humean 
theories in Section 5 and gesture at some widespread difficulties.) 
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3.1 Solution to the Peril of Insufficient Structure 
Hildebrand (2013) proposes a solution to the Peril of Insufficient Structure compatible 
with three main views in the metaphysics of laws: the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory 
(henceforth DTA) according to which laws are relations between universals (Dretske 
1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983); dispositionalist theories according to which 
fundamental properties are modally-laden dispositions (Mumford 2004; Bird 2007; 
Tugby 2013); and various forms of natural kind essentialism (Lowe 1989, 2006; Ellis 2001; 
Oderberg 2007; Dumsday 2013). These theories involve different modal primitives.20 
DTA posits primitive modally-laden external relations between universals; 
dispositionalism builds primitive modality into the essences of properties; and natural 
kind essentialism posits a kind of modality that unifies multiple properties together 
such that a collection of properties forms a natural kind whose essence is characterized 
by the relevant properties. Since properties feature in all of these accounts, we’ll call 
them property-based theories of laws. 
These theories avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure by positing modal 
relations among natural properties. The natural/non-natural distinction can be illustrated 
by way of example. Following Lewis (1983), we’ll say that properties are classes. Consider 
the class of green things. All and only green objects seem to be genuinely similar to 
one another in at least one respect—namely, in their color. Now consider the class of 
grue things, where an object is grue iff it is green and examined before time t or blue 
and unexamined before t (Goodman 1955, 74). Intuitively, there’s no guarantee that 
any two grue objects will be genuinely similar in color. To use an even more extreme 
example, contrast the classes {x: x is an electron} and {the Mona Lisa, the northern 
hemisphere of Pluto, the empty set}. The members of the first class seem to be exactly 
similar; the members of the second seem entirely dissimilar. In sum, some properties 
(classes) seem to capture genuine similarity; others do not. The former are more natural 
than the latter.21  
 
20 We’re using ‘modal’ in a broad sense, so that primitives like natural kind essence (that are strictly 
non-modal but have modal implications concerning property distributions) count as modal 
primitives. 
21 For more on the natural/non-natural distinction, see Lewis (1983), Armstrong (1989), and 
Sider (2011).  
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As we saw above, there is no reason to expect an arbitrarily selected primitive 
law to produce a regularity, or even a mere pattern. However, there is reason to expect 
an arbitrarily selected property-based law to give rise to some sort of order. Property-
based theories incorporate primitive modal connections into networks of natural 
properties. For DTA, they are external relations that bind first-order universals (where 
universals are understood to be the ground of natural properties); for dispositionalism, 
relations of manifestation and, if applicable, stimulus conditions form a network of 
natural properties; and similarly for natural kind essentialism. If there is a DTA law 
N(F,G), where N is the relation of nomic necessitation, the pattern that “all Fs are Gs” 
must follow. As instances of dispositions enter appropriate stimulus conditions, they 
must manifest. And if a natural kind K is characterized by natural properties F and G, 
anything that becomes K must also acquire F and G. If any necessary connection holds 
among natural properties, it seems inevitable that a pattern will result, at least in the 
long run. Conversely, consider a sentence D describing the particular matters of fact 
at a wholly disorderly world. Primitivism allows D to be a statement of law, but 
property-based theories seem not to allow this, since there is no clear way to translate 
D into a statement about nomic relations between universals, fundamental 
dispositions, or natural kinds.22 As a result, property-based theories appear to be better 
equipped to explain order than Primitivism. The prior probability that some property-
based theory is true (we’ll use the label N, short for ‘non-Humean property-based 
theories’), let us suppose, is similar to that of Primitivism: P(N)=P(L). But if the 
preceding discussion is correct, it would appear that the likelihoods concerning order 
(O) are very different: P(O|N)>>P(O|L). Thus, when it comes to the Peril of 
Insufficient Structure, we’ll grant that property-based theories appear to have an 
advantage over Primitivism.   
 
22 Possible exception: If we allow fundamental nomic relations of arbitrary complexity, the space 
of possible nomic relations might turn out to be isomorphic to the space of possible primitive 
laws, leading us back to the Peril of Insufficient Structure. This insight underlies Beebee’s 
(2011) objection to non-Humean solutions to the problem of induction, but see Hildebrand 
(2018) for a response. 
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3.2 Against property-based theories 
Property-based theories avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure by incorporating 
additional metaphysical structure into their accounts of laws and properties. As we 
saw, this places restrictions on lawhood; not just any sentence can be a statement of 
law. But this additional structure comes with a cost.  
 It’s one thing to provide a metaphysical theory that explains toy patterns such 
as “all Fs are Gs.” It’s another thing entirely to provide a metaphysical theory that 
explains the sophisticated regularities of modern science. Indeed, the literature is full 
of putative examples of sophisticated regularities that property-based theories are ill-
equipped to explain. For example, it has been argued: that dispositionalists and natural 
kind essentialists struggle to explain conservation laws;23 that dispositionalists struggle to 
explain retention laws (namely, the regularity that things are disposed to retain their 
dispositions over time in the absence of interferences);24 and that all property-based 
accounts struggle to explain functional laws,25 idealized laws,26 and putatively lawlike boundary 
conditions such as the Past Hypothesis (according to which the universe began in a low 
entropy state).27 These problems arise because it is difficult to translate statements of 
sophisticated laws—i.e., laws that describe regularities in our technical sense—into 
statements involving relations between natural properties. Solutions have been 
proposed, but we’re not aware of a property-based theory that is thought to offer a 
satisfying solution to all of these difficulties. The problem, in short, is that the 
metaphysical restrictions of property-based theories have turned out to be too restrictive. 
To their credit, they prevent us from attaching the ‘it is a law that’ operator to arbitrary 
sentences. But they seem to prevent us from attaching it to sentences describing 
regularities as well. 
Thus, while we’re happy to grant that P(O|N)>>P(O|L), that doesn’t entail 
that P(R|N)>>P(R|L). More work is needed to show that non-Humean property-
based theories can explain regularities. 
 
23 See Bird (2007, 213–214), Bigelow et al. (1992), Schurz (2011), and French (2014) for further 
discussion. 
24 See Tugby (2017). 
25 See, for example, Armstrong (1983: Chapter 7), Vetter (2009), and Collins (2009a).  
26 See Tan (2019).  
27 See Chen (forthcoming). 
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3.3  The Peril of Too Much Structure 
The problems discussed in 3.2 arise because of constraints on the way in which 
primitive necessities operate in property-based theories. Property-based accounts do 
appear to avoid the Peril of Insufficient Structure, because they constrain lawhood to 
statements of patterns. But the specific ways in which they incorporate naturalness 
have the additional effect of constraining the kinds of patterns that they can explain, 
so that they are unable to offer a satisfying explanation of regularities with the more 
sophisticated structure R that is of interest to us. If we have too many constraints, our 
theory will not have the flexibility required to explain the regularities featured in our 
best scientific theories. Call this the Peril of Too Much Structure. By way of contrast, notice 
that Primitivism seems to avoid this peril: for any law that scientists might postulate, 
primitivists can simply posit a primitive law that produces the relevant regularity.28 
Primitivism is maximally flexible. However, as we saw in Section 2, that leads to the 
Peril of Insufficient Structure. 
We’ll close this section by considering an objection. Given everything we’ve 
said, proponents of property-based theories might be tempted to reply as follows:  
 
You haven’t shown that there is no possible property-based theory that 
can succeed in explaining the sophisticated lawlike regularities 
distinctive of modern science. Consider some theory N* that is still 
property-based—and so avoids the Peril of Insufficient Structure—
while being flexible enough to accommodate functional laws, 
conservation laws, and the like. Wouldn’t that theory constitute a 
competitor to Divine Voluntarism? 
 
Reply: As it stands now, we don’t know what the content of this hypothetical N* would 
be, and so we think the burden of proof is on the friend of property-based theories to 
flesh out and motivate the theory. Nevertheless, we can at least gesture at some 
difficulties. N* might founder on the Peril of Insufficient Structure, analogously to 
 
28 We deny that Primitivists can explain (in the relevant sense) such regularities, but they can at 
least make sense of the modal force of such laws, their ability to support counterfactuals, etc.  
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Primitive Laws. Suppose, for example, that we allowed nomic relations of arbitrary 
complexity, or that we allowed nomic relations to relate non-natural properties. These 
solutions relax the very constraints that allow property-based theories to avoid the 
Peril of Insufficient Structure in the first place. A further potential difficulty is this: A 
mere relaxing of constraints on property-based theories doesn’t make it particularly 
likely that we’d observe regularities as opposed to mere patterns. Moreover, a property-
based theory N* that can accommodate regularities might be considerably more 
specific than property-based theories in general, and thus P(N*) might be considerably 
less than P(N). So even if some property-based theory is capable of explaining 
regularities in modern science, it may be that Divine Voluntarism offers a better 
explanation—either because P(R|G) > P(R|N*) or because P(G) > P(N*). With that 
said, we’ll take a closer look at the values of P(R|G) and P(G) in Sections 4 and 5, 
respectively.   
4 Divine Voluntarism and the two perils 
To recap, Primitivism avoids the Peril of Too Much Structure, but it founders on the 
Peril of Insufficient Structure. Property-based accounts avoid the Peril of Insufficient 
Structure, but they founder on the Peril of Too Much Structure. As a result, the 
likelihoods P(R|L) and P(R|N) are too low to provide a good explanation of 
regularities. Accordingly, the crucial question is whether there is any middle ground: 
any space for a theory with enough internal metaphysical structure to avoid the Peril 
of Insufficient Structure, but enough flexibility to avoid the Peril of Too Much 
Structure. We think that Divine Voluntarism strikes exactly the right balance, offering 
an elegant solution to both perils. It has more structure than Primitivism, since it 
countenances God’s power and God’s will. But it appears to have less structure—and 
more flexibility—than property-based theories, since it seems that any regularity that 
scientists could posit could be a regularity that God could will. The crucial question, 
then, is this: Should we expect God to have a preference for regularities? In this 
section, we’ll argue that the answer is ‘Yes.’ We’ll start with a modest goal. In 4.1, we’ll 
argue that God probably has preferences concerning order, with the result that P(O|G) 
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>> P(O|H). In 4.2, we’ll extend our arguments from order to regularity to show that 
P(R|G) >> P(R|H). 
4.1 Divine Voluntarism and order 
Recall that Humeanism can’t explain order (or regularities, for that matter), because (i) 
the set of possible worlds it entails has vastly more disorderly (or irregular) worlds than 
orderly (or regular) worlds and (ii) the ontology seems to require a uniform probability 
distribution across Humean possible worlds. The problem for Primitivism is similar. 
It entails a set of possible worlds isomorphic to that of Humeanism. And like 
Humeanism, its ontology seems to require a uniform probability distribution over 
possible laws (and thus over possible worlds), with the result that it confers no 
explanatory advantages over Humeanism. We’ll grant that the set of possible worlds 
countenanced by Divine Voluntarism is isomorphic to that of both Humeanism and 
Primitivism. However, there is good reason to think that the ontology of Divine 
Voluntarism does not require a uniform probability distribution over possible worlds 
compatible with Divine Voluntarism. In fact, there is good reason to think that the 
orderly worlds (and as we’ll argue in 4.2, regular worlds) countenanced by Divine 
Voluntarism should receive a disproportionately large portion of the probability 
distribution. Our overall strategy is to argue that this follows from the concept of 
God’s intentional will.  
Our argument has two basic premises.  
 
P1: God might have certain higher-order preferences—that is, preferences 
directed towards higher-order emergent properties, including moral and 
aesthetic properties but perhaps others besides, or preferences concerning 
patterns or the content of laws themselves.  
 
P2: The vast majority of possible higher-order preferences require orderly 
worlds.  
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These premises entail that the probability function that captures God’s preferences 
privileges orderly worlds in such a way that P(O|G) >> P(O|H).  
Let’s begin with P1. Why should we think that it’s possible for God to have 
preferences for higher-order emergent properties, especially patterns, order, and moral 
or aesthetic properties? It seems to follow from the concept of mind itself. This is 
suggested by what we observe about minds, both introspectively and elsewhere in 
nature. As for introspection, we find that we have the ability to recognize patterns. 
Indeed, pattern recognition seems to be constitutive of an important kind of thought. 
Since we have the ability to recognize patterns, probably, so does God. And if God 
has that ability, then patterns are, insofar as we can tell, a potential target for God’s 
preferences. As for experience concerning other minds, the more intelligent a being is, 
the more it values order per se and various goods that require order. Non-sentient 
beings don’t value order at all. Sentient beings have some preference for order, and 
some preference for moral and aesthetic goods. Birds (e.g. bowerbirds) sometimes 
value aesthetic goods. Chimpanzees seem to sometimes value moral goods, even if 
they don’t conceptualize them as moral.29 And humans care a lot about moral and 
aesthetic values—even if, sometimes, their goals are evil or in poor taste (more on this 
in a moment). Our point, in short, is simply that intelligent beings can and do have 
preferences directed towards higher-order emergent properties (and towards value 
properties in particular).30 Since God is intelligent, God’s preferences might be directed 
toward such targets, instead of being directed toward first-order property distributions 
only. Again, even if there’s no special reason to think that God would in fact share our 
values, higher-order emergent properties seem to be perfectly legitimate intentional 
targets, so to speak. Even if we know nothing about God other than that God is a 
powerful, intelligent being, we should at least be willing to grant that God’s preferences 
might be directed towards moral, aesthetic, and other higher-order emergent properties 
rather than towards mere first-order property distributions independently of any 
higher-order properties they instantiate. Notice that we aren’t claiming that God does 
 
29 De Waal (2006). 
30 They need not be value properties. Suppose that chemical properties are higher-order 
emergent properties grounded in more fundamental physical properties. A chemist might 
care about chemical properties, even if they’re of no intrinsic aesthetic or moral value. They 
might simply find them interesting. 
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in fact care about higher-order properties, nor even that God probably cares about 
higher-order properties.31 Justifying a uniform probability function over possible 
worlds requires the claim that God would not care about such higher-order properties 
at all. That’s a tall order. P1, after all, makes a very modest claim. We have good reason 
to accept it.  
We’ll offer three arguments in support of P2. The first invokes paradigm moral 
properties, all of which require a certain degree of order or regularity. The second is 
based on paradigm aesthetic properties, most of which require a certain degree of 
order or regularity. The third is based on a more technical notion of compressibility.  
First, we should accept P2 because moral properties require some degree of 
order. The most-familiar and least-controversial moral properties emerge from 
conscious states of thinking things.32 The physical basis of moral properties requires 
an extremely high degree of order—namely, the sort of order required for the 
realization of complex functional properties exemplified in our world by brain states. 
Moreover, moral goods generally supervene on sentience over time, intentions over 
time, and preferences over time, and some alleged moral goods (such as fairness, 
desert, and equality) supervene on large-scale synchronic properties. (Indeed, it’s hard 
even to conceive of how conscious states could realize moral properties in highly 
disorderly worlds. Could there be morality in worlds in which disembodied minds are 
simply observing chaotic particular matters of fact, with no ability to make interesting 
predictions about them and no ability to interact with other minds in predictable 
ways?) It is important to observe that the same is true of bad-making moral properties; 
as noted above, we are not committed to the claim that God is morally good.  Notice, 
 
31 Though one could. For example, one could argue that God, as an intelligent being, must 
care about them given moral or aesthetic rationalism, the view that essentially action-guiding 
normative properties can be known by pure reason (cf. Beiser 2009). If we had some degree 
of confidence that rationalism of this sort were true, that would be enough for our purposes. 
Though we do not claim that the God of Divine Voluntarism is theistic, readers might wish 
to consult some of the literature discussing reasons why a theistic God might prefer a regular 
universe. See, for example, Swinburne (2004, 99-106). Arguments that some divine attributes 
imply others are relevant as well (Swinburne 2004, 98ff; Foster 2004, Chapter 8). 
32 A few philosophers have argued that there may be ethical value even when there are no 
conscious beings (cf. Moore 1903: ch. III, § 50), but this is a controversial position. In contrast, 
nearly every ethicist agrees that if there are moral obligations at all, they generally apply to our 
treatment of conscious organisms. Beyond this, Moore’s cited example of goodness-without-
consciousness still requires regularity. 
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further, that our view does not require a commitment to moral realism, because first-
order normative theories still assume that what’s morally important, if anything is, are 
these properties.  
Second, we should accept P2 because most higher-order aesthetic properties 
require some degree of order. Aesthetic properties often supervene on coherence and 
unity, both synchronically and over time, and on mere persistence. (Consider the 
physics and biology behind a piece of music, or the chemistry and biology behind 
flavor combinations, etc.) Some aesthetic properties, as with moral properties, may 
require consciousness. If that is so, everything said about moral properties applies to 
this subset of aesthetic properties. But some aesthetic properties might be wholly 
independent of consciousness. We do not claim that it is impossible for disorderly 
things to have aesthetic qualities. A Jackson Pollock painting exhibits a large degree of 
disorder, at least on the surface.33 But part of its aesthetic appeal may be due to its 
contrast with the high degree of apparent order all around us (or to other artworks, 
such as those by Piet Mondrian). For comparison, consider something truly 
disorderly—say, the sort of image you’d expect if a computer were to generate a 
1000x1000 image by randomly selecting a color pixel by pixel. There are extraordinarily 
many such images that do not differ aesthetically in any interesting way: they just look 
like pure noise. Aesthetically speaking, all of them are lumped together. Insofar as one 
has a higher-order preference for the aesthetic quality noisy mess, presumably one would 
be indifferent among them. In contrast, there seems to be a wide range of aesthetically 
different properties among the various orderly arrangements. This is to say, a being 
whose aesthetic preferences are directed towards higher-order properties is more likely 
to prefer order, simply because there are more aesthetically-interesting differences 
among orderly possibilities.34 
 Our third argument for P2 is based on the notion of compressibility used in 
Information Theory.35 A sequence is compressible, roughly speaking, when it can be 
summarized 100% accurately (i.e. losslessly) in fewer bits of information than were 
 
33 Pollock’s paintings may be more orderly than they might initially appear (Taylor et al 1999). 
34 Our argument concerning aesthetic properties that do not rely on consciousness may 
depend on our third argument for P2. 
35 See, for example, Shannon (1948), Chaitin (1987), and Adriaans (2019).  
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originally required to state the sequence itself. For example, consider the following two 
sequences:  
A: 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 
B: 001100011010101111010010010010111001100010000101 
A can be compressed without loss in multiple ways: ‘01’ 24 times; ‘0101’ 12 times; etc. 
B is incompressible. If you try to describe it by way of a general pattern, you need 
more information than is required to write the sequence itself. Each sequence has 48 
digits. Now consider the space of possible sequences of 1s and 0s that are 48 digits 
long. The vast majority of such sequences are incompressible (see, for example, 
Chaitin (1966; 1969), and Chaitin (2007) for an accessible overview). But as an 
examination of sequence A illustrates, sometimes highly orderly sequences are not only 
compressible but are indeed compressible in many ways, where we can measure the 
relative degrees of compressibility (some compressions are shorter than others).  
 How is this relevant to our claim that God is more likely than chance to prefer 
orderly worlds? The basic idea is straightforward. Given P1, God’s preferences might 
be directed towards compressions of worlds rather than exhaustive point-by-point 
micro-level descriptions of worlds themselves. Consider two procedures: (1) Pick a 
possible world at random and actualize it. (2) Pick a possible preference at random and 
actualize a world satisfying that preference, chosen at random from the worlds 
compatible with that preference. Procedure (2) is more likely than Procedure (1) to 
actualize an orderly world, simply because there are more ways to accurately and 
completely describe orderly worlds than to describe disorderly worlds. (Massively 
disorderly worlds don’t have compressions, but orderly worlds do.) And clearly if we 
know nothing else about God, but are deciding how likely he is to prefer to create an 
orderly world, we should assign confidence indifferently across preferences, not across 
worlds. Thus, if God’s preferences can be directed towards compressions—which, for 
all we know, they might be—then even if we know nothing else about God, we should 
still expect it to be somewhat likely that God would choose to create an orderly world.36  
 
36 Further, it seems reasonable that an intelligent being might care about properties of 
compressions. In particular, it does not seem odd to suggest that God might be interested in 
extremely simple, elegant compressions of massive worlds. We’ll say more about this in 4.2. 
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This concludes our argument for why God would be likely to have a preference 
for orderly worlds. We’ll now consider three objections.  
First, someone might object that what appears orderly to us is only an artifact 
of our language. For example, perhaps ‘eternal chain of falling dominoes’ is language-
relatively orderly. Let the predicate ‘H’ mean (in some non-English language) that a 
phenomenon lasts for 1,000 years, and ‘J’ mean that a phenomenon exists after 1,000 
years of time have passed and continues eternally (cf. Lewis 1983: 367 and Goodman 
1955). If God “speaks” a language just like English except it has no predicate ‘eternal’ 
but does contain ‘H’ and ‘J,’ then ‘H chain of falling dominoes’ (n.b.: these are 
intentionally quotation marks, not Quine corners) might appear orderly to him, while 
‘chain of dominoes that’s H for 1,000 years and then becomes J’ might appear 
disorderly. One obvious answer to give is that ‘eternal’ is a natural predicate in Lewis’s 
(1983) sense, and ‘H’ and ‘J’ are non-natural, indeed, gruesome. An obvious follow-up 
question is epistemological: how do we identify naturalness and non-naturalness? We 
think it’s evident that the predicates used in scientific descriptions of regularities are 
more natural than their gruesome analogues. But there’s little else we can say in the 
space we have here other than to gesture at (for empiricists) the track-record success 
of science and (for rationalists) the possibility of synthetic a priori perception of 
naturalness (cf. Hildebrand 2019: 171; BonJour 1998). The latter is especially appealing 
to us because presumably naturalness is a necessary property (Hildebrand 2019: 165; 
Lewis 1986: 60-61, n. 44) and so a relatively plausible target of a priori justification. 
And besides, if you honestly don’t think that we have any justification for our choice 
of language, you probably have doubts about all explanatory arguments.  
Second, an anonymous referee suggested a distinction that might bear on our 
arguments. There are worlds in which God is the creator, and there are worlds in which 
a God exists without being the creator. Both constitute versions of Divine 
Voluntarism. However, a non-creator God might not care about the physical world at 
all. For the sake of argument, let’s grant that non-creator gods have less reason to care 
about the order of nature. It doesn’t follow that they have no reason to care about 
order. All the intelligent beings we know of care about order, despite not all being 
creators. Moreover, the hypothesis that God exists as creator and has the power to 
control whether there are patterns (including regularities) seems coherent and doesn’t 
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strike us as being that much stronger and more radical than Divine Voluntarism in 
general. We see no reason to think that we should partition these two versions of 
Divine Voluntarism as follows: The non-creator God worlds get the lion’s share of the 
probability, and the creator God worlds get almost none. But you’d need to defend 
that claim and the claim that non-Creator gods wouldn’t care in order to really damage 
the Nomological Argument. That feels like a tall order. 
Third, in an important paper, Neil A. Manson (2020) explains how a skeptic 
about natural theology might challenge our ability to discern what God is likely to 
create. Manson’s paper is aimed at the Fine-Tuning Argument, but we can adapt his 
points to challenge our claim about the value of P(O|G) as well. Roughly speaking, 
Manson argues that the fine-tuning skeptic may be justified in holding that the 
probability that God would create a certain sort of universe is inscrutable.37 There are 
essentially four ways to make this case. First, the skeptic might argue that no one is 
justified in making probability judgments at all. We set this aside because it’s far beyond 
the scope of this paper; we simply assume that we have a reasonably good ability to 
make objective-epistemic-probability judgments. (We do suspect that the denial of this 
claim might be self-defeating.)38 Second, the skeptic might argue that there are so many 
possible universes God could create that we just can’t be reasonably confident that any 
subset of universes is remotely probable. This may be a powerful objection to the Fine-
Tuning Argument, but we’ve already answered that sort of point as applied to the 
Nomological Argument: basically, the possibility of having preferences about 
regularity or higher-order properties at all means God is more likely than chance to 
prefer an orderly universe. Third, the skeptic might be requesting a systematic procedure 
for calculating the probability that God would prefer an orderly universe. In our view, 
this request would be reasonable if we were claiming to assign specific numerical values 
to the relevant statements of probability. However, since we can get by with rough 
inequalities, this request seems too demanding. (Must a prosecutor use a systematic 
 
37 Manson actually offers two arguments: simplifying somewhat, the first is that P(FT|G) is 
really low; the second is that P(FT|G) is inscrutable. We take our arguments above in 4.1 to 
address the analogue of the first of Manson’s arguments. The crucial issue is whether we 
have good reason for endorsing a non-uniform probability distribution over the space of 
worlds. Since we’ve already addressed this point, we won’t rehearse Manson’s first argument.  
38 Cf. Cuneo 2007 and Huemer 2017. 
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procedure and attach numerical estimates to calculating the intrinsic probability that a 
defendant was present at the murder scene?) Fourth and last, the skeptic might be 
arguing that for all we know, God has unknown reasons for preferring irregularity and/or 
disorder. This should remind us of skeptical theism about the Problem of Evil, and it 
inherits that position’s strengths and weaknesses. As for strengths, naturalist skeptics 
about our argument aren’t likely to want to say that skeptical theism is cogent. And as 
for weaknesses, we can borrow Michael Tooley’s reply: for all we know, God might 
have further, unknown reasons for preferring order (or even regularities) that would 
cancel out God’s possible unknown reasons for preferring disorder (or perhaps mere 
order).39 This answers a related objection as well: that finite beings such as us might not 
be able to discern various higher-order values that disorderly worlds instantiate or allow. 
Yes, that’s true; but we also might not be able to discern various higher-order values 
that orderly (and regular) worlds instantiate or allow. 
4.2 Divine Voluntarism and regularity 
We believe that our arguments in 4.1 can be adapted with minor modifications—or in 
some cases with no modifications—to show that God is more likely than chance to 
have a preference for regularities in addition to order.  
 Recall that we supported P1 by arguing that a preference for order is intimately 
related to what we know about minds. Well, a preference for regularity seems to fit 
with what we know about other minds as well, at least insofar as more capable minds 
tend to have an interest in more sophisticated patterns (when they can find them).  
 Now recall that we gave three arguments for P2. Do they give us reason to 
think that God might prefer regularity in addition to order? 
Our first argument involved preferences for moral properties. In 4.1, we 
argued that most moral properties require order—for example, the kind of patterns of 
brain states that realize mental states. After all, most moral properties are properties 
of, or depend on properties of, conscious beings. Now replace ‘patterns’ with 
‘regularities’. This replacement works simply because mere patterns are not 
sophisticated enough to ground mental and moral properties. Mental properties won’t 
 
39 Tooley 2012. See also Tooley 2020: § 3.5.1 for an intuitive explanation of the idea. 
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emerge from the toy pattern “all Fs are Gs”; you need functional realization at a 
minimum, which involves precisely the sort of sophistication involved in regularities.  
Our second argument involved preferences for aesthetic properties. As we 
noted in 4.1., some aesthetic properties require consciousness. If that’s right, then our 
argument in 4.1 shows that these aesthetic properties require regularities as well, for 
reasons discussed in the paragraph above. Though it’s plausible that some aesthetic 
properties don’t depend on consciousness—consider the simple patterns of Piet 
Mondrian—most aesthetic properties seem to require regularities. Consider how 
physicists often treat simplicity, elegance, and beauty as properties of equations; these 
seem to be perfectly legitimate intentional targets for a divine being, and they seem to 
require the level of sophistication featured in the equations of modern science. 
Philosophers’ toy examples—such as that “all Fs are Gs”—are too simplistic to exhibit 
such properties in any great measure. But as we suggested above (for example, in 
footnote 36), these seem to be perfectly reasonable targets for God’s preferences. 
 The third argument for P2 was based on the notion of compressibility. We 
argued that there are more possible compressions of orderly worlds than of disorderly 
worlds. The same is true of regular worlds. Regular worlds are compressible, so insofar 
as God might have preferences directed towards compressions, God is more likely 
than chance to have preferences for regular worlds. Moreover, since regular worlds are 
highly compressible, and the compressions themselves are good candidates for various 
aesthetic properties (such as elegance and beauty), this third argument nicely 
complements the second argument. As a result, Divine Voluntarism is not in the same 
boat as property-based theories when it comes to the Peril of Too Much Structure. 
Not only can it accommodate laws having the relevant sort of sophisticated structure, 
there’s reason to think that an intelligent being is likely to look favorably upon such 
laws. At least, God is more likely than chance to have preferences for them.  
At this point, we’ll consider an objection suggested to us by a referee. The 
objection targets our first argument for P2, and portions of our second argument 
insofar as certain aesthetically valuable states involve mental states of created beings. 
However, it does not target the compressibility argument, nor our aesthetic arguments 
that involve valuable states of nature, elegance of the contents of scientific laws, and 
so on, since these arguments do not involve the assignment of value to states of created 
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minds. In any case, one might suspect that God could create embodied moral agents 
in merely orderly worlds. After all, at least some Divine Voluntarists will hold that God 
is the author of psycho-physical laws—i.e., that the connection between the physical 
and mental is nomologically necessary as opposed to metaphysically necessary. If that 
were so, God would have many options for creating minds, and along with them 
valuable moral and aesthetic states of affairs. For example, in an objection to the Fine-
Tuning Argument, Neil Sinhababu suggests that God could have created very “mind-
friendly” laws:  
Under more mind-friendly psychophysical laws, protons and electrons 
themselves could have minds like ours. These laws could dictate that these 
particles have sensory experiences of all the forces other particles exert on 
them, with the forces most strongly affecting them giving rise to the 
psychology of belief and then intentional action.  Protons and electrons could 
yearn to be together, feeling delight at the presence of the other as their 
opposite charges drew them closer. (Sinhababu 2016, 424) 
If mind-friendly laws are on the table, perhaps regularities are unnecessary for the 
realization of valuable moral and/or aesthetic goods.  
For the sake of argument, we’ll grant that God has power over the content of 
psycho-physical laws, that Sinhababu’s case is possible, and even that Sinhababu’s 
objection succeeds against the Fine-Tuning Argument. However, by hypothesis, 
Sinhababu’s “electrons in love” acquire the mental states they do because of deep 
regularities in a sophisticated physical environment. God would need to create 
regularities in order to create “electrons in love.” Thus, Sinhababu’s example of mind-
friendly laws doesn’t pose any problems for the Nomological Argument. However, we 
do need to engage the following question: Could the possibility of mind-friendly laws 
in merely orderly worlds pose problems for the Nomological Argument?  
Suppose that Sinhababu had asked us to consider a chessboard world 
consisting solely of a mosaic of alternating black and white squares. The suggestion 
that the squares love each other in rich, complex, and varied ways seems ludicrous—
or at any rate much more ludicrous than the possibility of “electrons in love.” The 
only way we can make sense of it would be for God to issue a decree of the following 
sort: “Let it be a law that Square A1 acquires the exact mental states of Barack Obama 
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in the actual world; let it be a law that Square A2 acquires the exact mental states of 
Michelle Obama in the actual world.” It follows that A1 and A2 are in love. There is 
something very strange about this case: the chessboard seems utterly irrelevant to the 
valuable states of affairs instantiated in this world.40 Moreover, if the relevant mental 
states are indeed qualitatively identical to those of Michelle and Barack, there is a sense 
in which regularities have just been smuggled through the back door.  
What, then, could it look like for minds to exist in a merely orderly world? 
Functional realization involved in the mental emerging from the physical is off the 
table, so presumably such worlds will have to be dualistic. Thus, it is helpful to imagine 
yourself playing a video game. You are a disembodied soul connected (but somehow 
not by sophisticated psycho-physical laws) to a “body” in the in-game environment. 
The game will have to be very simple, of course. By hypothesis, it cannot include a 
physics engine with any sophistication. We’re limited to games like Pong and Super 
Mario Brothers. (Any game running a plausible 3D graphics engine will have a fairly 
sophisticated physics at minimum.) Moral properties are exhibited to a lesser extent in 
simple environments. Consider your options for helping or harming others in these 
in-game environments: you can bounce a ball. Perhaps, at best, you can “save the 
Princess,” so there might be rudimentary moral properties; we’re not claiming that no 
such properties can exist at all in simple environments, but that the properties that are 
present are much less interesting and varied. One’s enemies, if they exist at all, “die” 
by essentially disappearing, and it’s unclear how anything like real pain could ever exist. 
One’s options are much narrower than your options for helping or harming others in 
the actual world and in other worlds with scientific regularities. And similarly for 
aesthetic properties; the Pong environment is much less beautiful than sophisticated 
worlds in environments with modern physics engines. We think that the scientists who 
 
40 The very idea that chessboard-squares could love each other presupposes a substantive and 
controversial thesis in the philosophy of mind, something like a strong pan-possible-psychism, 
i.e. that any physical object could be conscious, and indeed conscious enough to realize morally 
and aesthetically interesting properties. We suspect that most philosophers, and especially 
most atheists, will reject this view; they will say for example that there are metaphysically 
necessary limits to the possible psycho-physical laws. It’s not obvious to us that the 
consciousness of a chessboard-square is even conceivable, and even if it were, there are well-
known reasons to doubt that such conceivability implies its possibility. (In the context of 
philosophy of religion, see e.g. van Inwagen’s (1977) “Ontological Arguments” and (1998) 
“Modal Epistemology.”) 
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regard various regularities to be “elegant” or “beautiful” would agree and would find 
them more beautiful than mere patterns. Here, then, is the takeaway. The mere 
existence of minds doesn’t suffice to allow all the various valuable states of affairs that 
might lead God to want to create minds in the first place. Rather, we need minds in 
worlds with regularities.  
 To sum up, then, our arguments in 4.1 can be adapted with minor 
modifications to show that God is more likely than chance to have  a preference for 
regularity. Indeed, we think they suggest that God probably does have a preference for 
regularity, and thus that P(R|G) >> P(R|H). Thus, Divine Voluntarism appears to 
provide the middle ground we’re looking for.  
4.3 Summing up 
We’ve argued that, unlike competing versions of non-Humeanism, Divine 
Voluntarism avoids both perils. The likelihood P(R|G) is much higher than the 
likelihoods of any other theories we’ve considered thus far. We thereby have reason 
to take Divine Voluntarism seriously. However, in spite of these advantages, we 
suspect that some will object to Divine Voluntarism for a different reason. That is the 
topic of Section 5.   
5 The prior probability of Divine Voluntarism 
One could accept everything we’ve said thus far, but argue on independent grounds 
that Divine Voluntarism faces a different peril of its own: it’s simply too implausible. 
To clarify, according to this objection, the prior P(G) isn’t low because one must 
artificially narrow the theory in order to secure a high likelihood P(R|G); rather, P(G) 
is too low for independent reasons. 
In this section, we argue that the prior probability of Divine Voluntarism is 
sufficiently high to block this objection. Our strategy is to argue that the assignment 
of priors should be deeply informed by the structure of the theories. We argue that 
Divine Voluntarism has a reasonably high intrinsic probability (don’t worry; we’ll 
explain what we mean by ‘intrinsic probability’ in just a moment). We hold that its 
intrinsic probability is high enough, in turn, to confer a sufficiently high prior 
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probability for the hypothesis of Divine Voluntarism—i.e. prior to considering other 
relevant arguments about the existence of supernatural beings—that it beats its leading 
competitors.  
Disclaimer: In employing this strategy, we’re interpreting the probabilities as 
objective epistemic probabilities. If you prefer to interpret probabilities as subjective 
epistemic probabilities, we hope that you’ll still find our argument that Divine 
Voluntarism deserves a non-negligible prior to be interesting (and perhaps even 
personally compelling).  
5.1 Prior probabilities and intrinsic probabilities 
In this section, we’ll assume that there are objective, epistemic, intrinsic probabilities: 
that there is some objective fact about one’s degree of justification in believing 
proposition p before examining any evidence e other than the calculation of the 
intrinsic probability itself (if that counts as “evidence”). This sort of probability is not 
the same as a prior probability per se, although perhaps one is sometimes justified in 
using intrinsic probabilities as prior probabilities. A prior probability is one’s 
justification before encountering some specific item of evidence (a prior probability is 
always prior to something), but usually after other items of evidence. In contrast, intrinsic 
epistemic probability is a degree of justification in believing that p merely by 
understanding the content of p and its contraries, and even before employing empirical 
observation and any other putative evidentiary faculty, except insofar as those faculties 
allow us to calculate the intrinsic probability itself. While this assumption may be 
controversial, we suspect that it is less controversial than Divine Voluntarism.41 For 
those who question how pervasive such an assumption is, consider the following 
example. 
Suppose that Monty offers you the choice between three doors, one of which 
conceals a car (which you want) and two of which conceal goats (which, while 
 
41 According to the PhilPapers surveys, only 15% of philosophers are theists. But Terence 
Cuneo (2007) reports (p. 116) that it is very difficult to find a philosopher who endorses 
epistemic nihilism. In general, philosophers who assert that various theories are justified, or 
that various arguments are cogent, are committing to some form of epistemic realism, and 
thus to intrinsic probabilities (cf. Huemer 2017: § 5 and passim; Huemer 2016 § 5.3).  
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charming, aren’t your goal). You know that no matter which door you choose, Monty 
will open a door you didn’t choose, revealing a goat. The standard view is that if you 
initially select Door A, and Monty then (without yet opening Door A) opens Door B 
to reveal a goat, and offers you the option to switch to Door C, then you should take 
it.42 But this judgment is puzzling if there are no such things as intrinsic, epistemic 
probabilities. In the story, you have the choice between three doors, and there are no 
apparent differences between them other than their numbering and spatial location, 
and in fact there is no empirical nor intuitive evidence about what they conceal. 
Therefore, even if you do have some prior epistemic probability that the car would be 
behind some particular door, it can’t be because of any specific item of evidence. If 
the likelihood that the car is behind Door C is to be objectively greater than it was 
before Monty’s opening of Door B, there must be some fact of the matter about the 
probability-distribution before any door was opened, and certain distributions must be 
objectively incorrect. (If for some reason you started out justified with certainty in 
assuming that the car was behind Door A, then it would be incorrect to switch.) In 
turn, the standard view of the Monty Hall Problem holds that one is initially justified 
in assigning ⅓ probability to the car’s being behind any particular door. Why? The 
obvious answer is that there are exactly three options and there seems to be exactly as 
much evidence for each.43 
Someone might question here whether these assignments report intrinsic 
probabilities, rather than a cognizer’s prior confidences. But without invoking intrinsic 
probabilities, it is difficult to justify the choice to assign a prior probability of ⅓ to each 
door. Why should the mere fact that there are three doors mean anything about how 
rational it is to assign any level of confidence to the car’s being behind any particular 
 
42 See e.g. Russell (2010: 464) for a discussion of this problem. 
43 This is the standard view, but of course there are dissenters, e.g. Bradley and Fitelson (2003), 
who argue that standard intrinsic-probability assumptions are unnecessary to deliver the 
conclusion that one ought to switch. Our quick reply is to recur to the other judgment we 
make: intuitively, it is objectively incorrect to begin unity-confident that the car is behind Door 
A, and objectively incorrect to begin 0.9-confident, and so on, but there is no reason to say it 
is objectively incorrect to begin ⅓-confident. Indeed, Bradley and Fitelson admit (p. 29) that 
they need to assume a thesis about prior or intrinsic probability anyway, viz. their assumption 
(7). We thank an anonymous referee for helping us to see the importance of noting this. 
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door? For prior confidences to be objectively correct, they must be based on some 
objective fact, and we hold that intrinsic probabilities are such an objective fact. 
5.2 Estimating intrinsic probabilities 
The philosophical project of coming up with a fully systematic, uncontroversial way 
to assign intrinsic probabilities is difficult.44 Therefore, we won’t attempt it here. 
Instead, we’ll proceed with some intuitive considerations about how to estimate 
intrinsic epistemic probabilities in particular cases. And in this project, we depart from 
many other presentations of design arguments. Such presentations commonly don’t 
attempt to estimate an intrinsic probability for theism, but instead simply try to estimate 
the evidential contribution of some alleged item of evidence, such as apparent biological 
design or apparent fine-tuning (e.g. Collins 2009b). However, in part because Divine 
Voluntarism is a weaker (and thus a priori more plausible) explanatory hypothesis than 
one required for standard design arguments, we think that it’s worthwhile to engage in 
this project.  
How, then, should we estimate intrinsic probabilities? Paul Draper (2017: 69 
ff.) offers a plausible theory of intrinsic probabilities according to which they depend 
on the modesty and coherence of a hypothesis. A hypothesis is modest to the degree that it 
does not commit us to saying very much about the world. A hypothesis is coherent to 
the degree that its conjuncts or elements cohere well with each other: they fit together 
well, or they raise, or at least don’t lower, each other’s (conditional) probabilities. We 
will estimate the intrinsic probability of Divine Voluntarism by partitioning the 
probability-space based on modesty and coherence. We assume, of course, that the 
sum of the probabilities of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive individual 
disjuncts within some proposition cannot exceed the probability of that (disjunctive) 
proposition itself. With this principle as a guide, we can proceed.  
5.3 The intrinsic probability of Divine Voluntarism 
Our goal is to roughly estimate the intrinsic probability of Divine Voluntarism Pi(G).  
In the next section we’ll discuss how our estimate is relevant to the prior probability of 
 
44 See our discussion on pp. 7-8, especially footnotes 14 and 15. 
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Divine Voluntarism P(G). That will be the appropriate time to discuss considerations 
of ontological parsimony, other evidence for or against the existence of God, and the 
like. But for now, we’ll try to outline a general procedure for estimating Pi(G). The 
idea, in a nutshell, is to provide a taxonomy of theories of natural necessity that carves 
logical space into broad, coherent, general categories of approximately equal modesty. 
We’ll borrow the general taxonomy from Hildebrand (2020).  
 To begin, consider two very general hypotheses: Humeanism and non-
Humeanism. They are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, so Pi(H v ~H) = 1. 
Pace Hume, they appear equally coherent. Both are exceedingly simple, so there’s little 
room for incoherence in either theory.45 They appear equally modest as well. One 
asserts that there is a big, far-reaching brute fact about distributions of properties while 
remaining non-committal about the nature of the distribution. The other asserts that 
there is a big, far-reaching source of natural necessity, while remaining non-committal 
about the nature of the non-Humean natural necessity. Thus, although they involve 
different primitives, the two theories in their most general form exhibit a sort of 
symmetry. As a result, we should grant roughly equal intrinsic probability to both.46  
Let’s turn to the classification of non-Humean theories. Suppose that nature 
is a mosaic of particular matters of fact. In relation to the mosaic, where are your nomic 
necessities? They could exist independently of the mosaic and impose structure on it 
from the outside. Relative to Humeanism, these theories are inflationary, because they 
posit additional entities. Alternatively, nomic necessities could exist as a part of the 
mosaic, imposing structure from within. We’ll call such theories revisionary, because 
they revise the Humean description of the facts constituting the mosaic itself. This 
distinction is exhaustive, but not exclusive, since some accounts posit both sorts of 
 
45 Inspired by Hume, some philosophers believe that primitive modalities are simply 
unintelligible. We follow Wilson (2010) in thinking that the rejection of primitive modalities is 
difficult to motivate without a (nowadays unpopular) Humean account of concept formation. 
Others might think that all non-Humean theories founder on van Fraassen’s (1989) inference 
problem, which challenges non-Humeans to make sense of how their primitives succeed in 
producing regularities. We follow Schaffer (2016) in thinking that van Fraassen’s challenge can 
be answered via stipulation. 
46 In contrast, consider these two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive hypotheses: Either 
there is a god who wishes for nature to include exactly four unicorns or there isn’t. Those two 
hypotheses exhibit an obvious asymmetry in terms of the facts that they can accommodate, so 
they are not equally modest and do not have an equal intrinsic probability. 
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natural necessity. However, both options appear to be perfectly coherent, and both 
seem equally modest: each holds that these necessities exist; they disagree only about 
where the necessities come from.47  
What more can be said about natural necessities? For starters, are they just 
primitive, full stop, or do they admit of deeper analysis? Both options seem to be 
perfectly coherent. As for modesty, as before, one hypothesis asserts that a large, 
important class of phenomena is analyzable and the other asserts that a large, 
important class of phenomena is primitive. Thus, we’ll suppose that primitive and 
analyzable accounts of non-Humean laws have the same intrinsic probability. (In fact, 
this supposition might be generous to Primitivism, at least if one is sympathetic to the 
considerations behind the Principle of Sufficient Reason.) Treating natural necessity 
as primitive yields Primitivism if you’re an inflationist. If you’re a revisionist, treating 
natural necessity as primitive yields something like Primitivism—namely, a theory of 
the sort proposed by Marc Lange (2009) and Ann Whittle (2009) according to which 
fundamental modally-robust singular facts are responsible for patterns in nature.48 
Suppose, then, that natural necessities do admit of deeper analysis. What 
options are available? Broadly speaking, we can think of three: The analysis might 
involve properties, intentionality, or something undreamt of. As we’ve seen, there are 
property-based variants of both revisionism and inflationism. Revisionism combined 
with primitive intentionality results in Panpsychism (Dolbeault, 2017).49 Inflationism 
combined with primitive intentionality results in Divine Voluntarism (or something 
much like it). And as for primitives undreamt of? Well, it would be silly to speculate 
about what sorts of theories would result given that option, but more on this in a 
moment. In any case, there is a radical difference between accounts that posit a non-
intentional sort of natural necessity (as property-based accounts do) and accounts that 
involve fundamental intentionality. These two options thus seem equally coherent (for 
 
47 Of course it’s possible for inconsistencies to arise as theories are developed and refined, but 
this is not unique to non-Humeanism.  
48 We think these theories fall prey to the Peril of Insufficient Structure, because there is no 
explanation of patterns among the fundamental singular facts, but that claim probably deserves 
its own paper.  
49 Panpsychism has some structural similarities to the theories of Lange (2009) and Whittle 
(2009), so we are inclined to think that it is susceptible to the Peril of Insufficient Structure as 
well.  
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the same reason that the above divisions are) and equally modest; presumably only if 
we were already (question-beggingly) committed to naturalism or theism, etc., would 
we say that intentional explanations are fundamentally more or less modest. 
To wrap up our taxonomy, we’ll consider one additional distinction 
concerning an intelligent being’s degree of power/ability. To illustrate, consider this 
competitor to Divine Voluntarism:   
 
Limited Voluntarism: There is an intelligent being that has the power to 
intentionally control whether there are regularities (in at least part of the world 
it inhabits), but it does not have the power to control whether nature is orderly.  
 
If it seems difficult to imagine how a being might be able to control regularities without 
being a supernatural creator with power over order, consider something like Bostrom’s 
(2003) simulation hypothesis. Our world might be a simulated world-within-a-world, 
where the enclosing world is understood to be a physical law-governed place. The 
person running the simulation has power over the regularities in the simulated world, 
but not over the order (or even regularities) of their own world. This version of 
Limited Voluntarism is of little relevance to the Nomological Argument. Because it 
posits regularities in the physical base reality, it simply pushes the explanatory problem 
back a level. Some versions of Limited Voluntarism do not. For example, perhaps 
there are many gods, some of them more powerful than others, and one of the less 
powerful gods creates a simulated reality, despite being unable to control the order of 
its own reality. This is an interesting hypothesis, but it gives rise to a dilemma, 
depending on how it is developed. If the “limited” being is very powerful and 
intelligent, the hypothesis is so similar to Divine Voluntarism that we don’t feel the 
need to consider it carefully in this paper. On the other hand, if the limited being is far 
less impressive then it’s unclear that the hypothesis offers a very good explanation of 
regularities.  
That concludes the taxonomy. Do its divisions group theories in a natural way, 
generating a classification of theories that are coherent and more-or less equally 
modest? We think so. For the most part, we’ve relied on exhaustive distinctions, where 
the options in question track fundamentally different ontologies. In other words, they 
39 
do not feel arbitrary, but seem to result in a taxonomy of theories that displays at least 
rough symmetry. We acknowledge one area in which our distinctions are not 
exhaustive—namely, concerning theories undreamt of. One might be tempted to 
object that these deserve a much larger intrinsic probability, but that approach 
threatens to undermine all explanatory arguments.  
Finally, let’s return to the question “What is the intrinsic probability of Divine 
Voluntarism?” Forget about precise numbers. The crucial takeaway is this. Insofar as 
these divisions seem fairly natural—that is, insofar as they involve highly general 
theories that appear to be of similar modesty—all such theories ought to receive a 
non-negligible intrinsic probability. Divine Voluntarism seems to be just as coherent 
and modest as its relevant competitors. Given the generality and modesty of Divine 
Voluntarism, any reasonable way of carving up our space of possible hypotheses 
should deliver this same result. This result concerning intrinsic probability will suffice 
to make our case, since we argued above that there is a massive disparity in likelihoods 
such as that P(R|G) >> P(R|H), and in 5.4 we’ll argue that the prior probability of 
Divine Voluntarism P(G) doesn’t differ significantly from its intrinsic probability Pi(G).   
5.4 From intrinsic probability to prior and posterior probability 
Recap: Here in Section 5, we’re considering the prior probability of Divine Voluntarism 
P(G), and in particular the claim that it is too low for it to be the best explanation of 
regularities. The first step of our response (5.3) is our argument that the intrinsic 
probability of Divine Voluntarism Pi(G) is non-negligible. In a state of total ignorance, 
we should set our prior P(G) to the intrinsic probability Pi(G). However, we’re not 
operating from a position of total ignorance. The second step of our response (5.4) 
considers potential evidence against Divine Voluntarism that might lower its prior. 
Disclaimer: Since we’re presenting an ampliative argument, we cannot assume that we’ve 
taken into account all relevant evidence. However, we can make a number of points 
that weigh in favor of setting P(G) close to Pi(G). That will suffice for a defense of our 
claim that Divine Voluntarism beats its relevant competitors. (Remember, we’re not 
arguing that P(G|R) > .5, but just that P(G|R) > P(T|R) for leading competitors T.)  
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First, someone might argue that the prior probability of Divine Voluntarism is 
much lower than our estimate, because among analyzable non-Humean theories of 
laws we should not equally partition the probability space between the regularities’ 
being intentionally created and non-intentionally governed. Instead, given that we are 
normally inclined to think that most events are mindlessly caused, induction suggests 
a very low probability for ‘intentional creation.’ But this argument begs the question. 
If Divine Voluntarism is true, then there is a sense in which all events have an 
explanation in terms of God’s intentional action. Indeed, Draper (2017: 70 ff.) admits 
that the minimal theses of Source Physicalism (according to which everything mental 
is caused by something physical) and Source Idealism (according to which everything 
physical is caused by something mental) have roughly equal intrinsic probability.  
Second, someone might argue that certain evidence against theism renders the 
prior probability of theism (prior to encountering regularities) to be so low as to be 
negligible. For example, perhaps Tooley’s (2008) version of the Problem of Evil shows 
that Anselmian theism is vanishingly unlikely. However, Divine Voluntarism does not 
require a theistic god. A theistic God seems likely to want to create regularities (so that 
it can create important moral or aesthetic properties), but as we argued in Section 4, 
we think that a merely intelligent god is still not very unlikely to want to create 
regularities, even if it has evil intentions. The hypothesis of a “merely intelligent” God 
is much less susceptible to the Problem of Evil. On a similar subject, someone might 
argue that in terms of our experience, minds tend to be physical or supervene on 
physical substrates. Especially if minds tend to depend for their existence on physical 
regularities, this might lower the prior probability of God. In reply, we can’t delve too 
deeply into the debate between materialism and dualism (or, for that matter, idealism), 
but we don’t think that dualism has been convincingly shown to be vanishingly 
improbable. More generally, we haven’t argued that all minds depend for their 
existence on physical regularities, but instead, that some immaterial minds would have 
reasons (detailed in § 4) to create minds that do depend on physical regularities. In any 
case, if this objection were decisive, it would undermine nearly all natural-theology 
arguments, so we don’t believe it needs further attention here. 
Third, one might argue that non-Humean theories should be assigned a 
significantly lower prior probability due to considerations of ontological parsimony. 
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Such principles are controversial (Huemer 2009; Sober 2009; Kriegel 2013: 18 ff.; 
Metcalf 2016), but even if we grant them, it seems implausible that they would have 
sufficient impact to take us from a non-negligible intrinsic probability to a truly 
negligible prior.  
The last point we want to make in favor of setting P(G) close to Pi(G) is that 
intrinsic probabilities seem to be a good starting point for the type of metaphysical 
hypotheses we are considering. Immediate experience does not directly inform us 
which theory is true. And as for background scientific knowledge, the Nomological 
Argument is concerned with an explanation of the fact that our world is conducive to 
scientific inquiry in the first place, so our question is at a level of abstraction above 
whether our explanation itself coheres with any specific scientific theory. In general, 
this is to say that any a posteriori argument for one metaphysical hypothesis over 
another (of the sort we are considering here) will have to rely on intrinsic probabilities 
of the sort we’ve defended. (We’ve argued that such probabilities can be understood 
and defended as objective, but subjectivists will also have to start with a prior 
confidence in some metaphysical hypothesis, and many philosophers will start with a 
prior confidence P(G) that is not extremely low.) 
Therefore, in assigning a prior probability to Divine Voluntarism, it seems 
appropriate to begin with its intrinsic probability. Though considerations of 
ontological parsimony might result in a lower prior, they are too weak to result in a 
significantly lower prior. We conclude that Divine Voluntarism has a sufficiently high 
prior probability that it does indeed provide a better explanation of regularities than 
the competing theories we’ve considered. As noted, there might be other evidence 
against Divine Voluntarism that renders the all-things-considered epistemic 
probability of such an explanation lower than its proponents might like, but there are 
no obvious candidates for such evidence. 
6 Conclusion 
We have argued that Divine Voluntarism offers a better explanation of natural 
regularities than its most-prominent competitors do. It has enough internal structure 
that it predicts regularities (as opposed to irregularities, as Humeanism and Primitivism 
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predict). But its structure is sufficiently flexible that it can explain any regularity that 
has been or could be devised by natural scientists (unlike certain property-based 
theories of laws). Further, we’ve argued that it’s reasonable to assign Divine 
Voluntarism a non-negligible intrinsic and therefore prior probability, given that (i) 
Divine Voluntarism is approximately as modest and general as its main competitors at 
that level of explanation; (ii) extant objections to non-Humeanism in general and to 
explanatory arguments in general are unsuccessful (a claim we’ve simply assumed, 
rather than defended); and (iii) extant arguments for atheism (such as the Problem of 
Evil) and against other teleological arguments do not apply to Divine Voluntarism.  
It would take a much longer work to fully defend the Nomological Argument 
against all possible rivals, or to show that justifying Divine Voluntarism would in turn 
justify classical or Anselmian theism. But we take our arguments to constitute an 
important step toward a defense, so that Divine Voluntarism at least warrants 
attention. At the end of the day, you might be left with the feeling that our appeal to 
a god is like cheating. But that’s exactly our point.50 
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